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Chapter 9
Whither the Weather?
Until recently, most writings on the relationship between climate change and security were
highly speculative. The IPCC assessment reports to date offer little if any guidance on this
issue and occasionally pay excessive attention to questionable sources. The articles pub-
lished in this special issue form the largest collection of peer-reviewed writings on the topic
to date. The number of such studies remains small compared to those that make up the
natural science base of the climate issue, and there is some confusion whether it is the effect
of ‘climate’ or ‘weather’ that is being tested. The results of the studies vary, and ﬁrm
conclusions cannot always be drawn. Nevertheless, research in this area has made consid-
erable progress. More attention is being paid to the speciﬁc causal mechanisms linking
climate change to conflict, such as changes in rainfall and temperature, natural disasters, and
economic growth. Systematic climate data are used in most of the articles and climate
projections in some. Several studies are going beyond statebased conflict to look at possible
implications for other kinds of violence, such as intercommunal conflict. Overall, the
research reported here offers only limited support for viewing climate change as an important
influence on armed conflict. However, framing the climate issue as a security problem could
possibly influence the perceptions of the actors and contribute to a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
9.1 Introduction
Violence is on the wane in human affairs, even if slowly and irregularly (Goldstein
2011; Pinker 2011).1 In recent years, however, pundits and politicians, along with a
few scholars, have raised the specter that this encouraging trend towards peace
1This article was originally published in Journal of Peace Research 49(1): 4–9, 2012.
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might be reversed by environmental change generally and by climate change
speciﬁcally.2 In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace prize, for instance,
President Obama (2009) warned that ‘[t]here is little scientiﬁc dispute that if we do
nothing, we will face more drought, more famine, more mass displacement—all of
which will fuel more conflict for decades’. He would have been more accurate had
he said that there is little if any scientiﬁc agreement about these points.
Despite the increasing certainty about global warming and the man-made con-
tribution to it, the two central premises of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), uncertainty continues about many of the physical consequences of
climate change and even more so about the social consequences. This uncertainty is
compounded by confusion about the deﬁnition of ‘climate’, an issue to which I
return below. The IPCC is not charged with the task of doing research; rather it
‘reviews and assesses the most recent scientiﬁc, technical and socio-economic
information produced worldwide’. In an area where little or no research has been
conducted, the IPCC has a poor basis for an assessment. Therefore, the two most
recent assessment reports (IPCC 2001, 2007) had little to say about the security
implications of climate change. Unfortunately, in the absence of peer-reviewed
sources, these reports fell prey to the temptation to cite occasional ‘grey material’,
particularly in the Africa chapter of the 2007 report (Nordås/Gleditsch 2009).
Indeed, a document explaining the principles for the preparation of its reports
(IPCC 2008) approves the use of non-peer reviewed sources in areas where few
peer-reviewed sources are available. In a wide-ranging examination of the IPCC,
the InterAcademy Council, an umbrella organization of national academies of
science, cited a study that found that while 84 % of the sources for IPCC’s Working
Group 1 on the physical science basis derived from peer-reviewed sources, it was
only 59 % for Working Group 2 on the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural
systems to climate change (IAC 2010: 16). It also acknowledged that some gov-
ernments, particularly in developing countries, had not always nominated the best
experts, that the author selection process suffered from a lack of transparency, and
that the regional chapters did not always make use of experts from outside the
2With a single exception (De Stefano et al. 2012) the articles in this special issue are based on
papers or presentations at the international conference on ‘Climate Change and Security’, held in
Trondheim, Norway, 21–24 June 2010 under the auspices of the Norwegian Royal Society for
Sciences and Letters, on the occasion of its 250th anniversary. A large ‘thank you’ is due to the
Society and its sponsors for the anniversary conferences: NTNU, Statoil/Hydro, and the
Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research. Generous additional ﬁnancial support was pro-
vided by the Research Council of Norway. My fellow members of the organizing committee for
the conference, Ola Listhaug and Ragnar Torvik, helped to shape the program, raise funds, and get
the event off the ground. Rune Slettebak assisted the committee through the whole process,
including the selection of conference papers and presentations invited to submit draft articles.
Julien Bessière skillfully created and maintained the conference website. We are also grateful to all
the participants of the conference and the dozens of reviewers, who have greatly influenced the
contents of the special issue. Finally, most of the contributors to the special issue commented
critically and constructively on a draft of this introduction, as did Andrew Mack, William
Nordhaus, and Roger A. Pielke Jr. None of them share any responsibility for whatever errors
remain.
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region (IAC 2010: 18)—all of which sheds some light on the discussion of security
issues in the Africa chapter in the 2007 report.
In the introduction to the ﬁrst special issue of an academic journal devoted to the
topic of climate change and conflict, Nordås/Gleditsch (2007) found little support
for the climate-conflict nexus in the academic literature and outlined ﬁve priorities
for future research in this area:
• a disentangling of the causal chains between climate change and conflict
• a tighter coupling of climate change models and conflict models
• a reconsideration of the kind of violence expected to result from climate change
• a balance of positive and negative effects
• an increased focus on the Third World where climate change will matter most.
Meanwhile, a number of studies relevant to the climate-conflict nexus have been
published and this special issue adds 16 more. What have we achieved in terms of
the ﬁve goals outlined in 2007?
9.2 Disentangling Causal Chains
Virtually all the articles in this special issue try to disentangle the causal chains
between climate change and conflict.3 By far the largest number of studies in the
literature generally and in this issue look at how climate variability and speciﬁcally
changes in precipitation may affect conflict through adverse effects on rainfed
agriculture or cattle herding.4 Adano et al. (2012: 77), for instance, ﬁnd for two
districts in Kenya that ‘more conflicts and killings take place in wet seasons of
relative abundance’ and Theisen (2012: 93), who also studies Kenya, concludes that
‘years following wetter years [are] less safe than drier ones’. Butler/Gates (2012)
derive a similar conclusion from a formal model. Benjaminsen et al. (2012: 108)
state on the basis of the Mopti region of Mali, at the heart of the Sahel, that there is
‘little evidence supporting the notion that water scarcity and environmental change
are important drivers of inter-communal conflicts’.5 Hendrix/Salehyan (2012)
conclude on the basis of a new database of social conflict in Africa, that rainfall
deviations in either direction are associated with conflict, but that violent events are
more responsive to heavy rainfall. Of course, while providing water in abundance,
heavy rainfall can also produce subsequent scarcities through the damage caused by
flooding. Raleigh/Kniveton (2012), on the basis of data from East Africa, also ﬁnd
that rainfall deviations in either direction are associated with conflict, but argue that
3For a model of possible causal pathways from climate change to conflict (see Buhaug et al. 2010:
Fig. 6).
4Although the importance of agriculture is assumed rather than measured in terms of employment
or production.
5Theisen et al. (2011–12), who use disaggregated data for Africa, also ﬁnd no relationship between
drought and civil war.
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civil war is more likely in anomalously dry conditions whereas wet conditions are
more likely to be associated with non-state conflict. Koubi et al. (2012) investigate
whether climate variability may influence armed conflict through its effect on
economic development. Although their literature review leads them to hypothesize
that climate variability should affect economic growth, they do not ﬁnd (either in a
global study or in a separate analysis for sub-Saharan Africa) any statistically
signiﬁcant impact of climate variability on growth. There is no general link between
climate variability and conflict through economic growth, although autocracies may
be more vulnerable to conflict through this mechanism. A few articles also have
data on variations in temperature, a possible climate driver of conflict that has
received considerable attention in a prominent cross-disciplinary journal (Burke
et al. 2009; Buhaug 2010).
Two of the articles here (Slettebak 2012; Bergholt/Lujala 2012) look at natural
disasters as a cause of conflict, although the latter article also uses disasters as an
instrument for economic shocks. While Slettebak concludes that there may be an
increasing trend in climate-related natural disasters, he sharply contradicts earlier
research on the link between natural disasters and conflict (e.g. Nel/Righarts 2008)
and ﬁnds support for an argument derived from crisis sociology that people tend to
unite in adversity. Bergholt and Lujala ﬁnd that natural disasters have a negative
effect on economic growth, but that this does not translate into an increased risk of
conflict. In a scenario study for sub-Saharan Africa, Devitt/Tol (2012) ﬁnd that the
impact of civil war and climate change on economic growth in Africa has been
underestimated.
Despite much public concern about the effects of sea-level rise,6 this is not yet a
theme that has received much attention in the conflict literature. Neither are there
any articles on possible adverse security effects of possible countermeasures to
climate change—the effect of biofuel on agricultural prices and possibly on food
riots could have provided an interesting case.7
9.3 Climate Models
Climate research provides an important source of data for much of the research on
security effects. The majority of the articles in this issue make use of systematic data
on levels and change of precipitation. Most of them use empirical data for the past
few decades and assess the empirical regularities that can be assumed to continue at
least in the near future. Only two of the articles (Bernauer/Siegfried 2012; De
Stefano et al. 2012) cite projections from climate models as well, while Devitt/Tol
(2012) use economic projections from IPCC’s Special Report on Emission
6In a wide-ranging review of possible security implications of climate change, Scheffran/Battaglini
(2011) include sea-level change as a source of potential conflict in South Asia.
7For an ethical argument along these lines, see Gomiero et al. (2010).
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Scenarios. While our models of conflict are certainly imperfect, and the ability of
social scientists to make predictions is limited (Schneider et al. 2010; Ward et al.
2010), current climate models and even data for the past few decades leave much to
be desired in terms of forecasting accuracy and geographical precision.
9.4 Types of Violence
Traditionally, research on armed conflict has concentrated on interstate war and
civil war. By far the largest killer in the 20th century, however, was one-sided
violence (including genocide and politicide) and environmental change has already
been linked by some to major episodes of such violence in Rwanda and Darfur.8
While so far there is not much evidence that robustly links climate change to major
armed conflict of any of these three types, there is a more plausible argument that it
may influence intergroup violence below the state level, ‘nonstate violence’ in the
language of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program9 or intercommunal conflict in the
language of Benjaminsen et al. (2012).
The bulk of the articles, however, deal with internal conflict. Although some of
them focus exclusively on state-based civil conflicts, others examine non-state
conflicts in a rural setting, or both types. None of the articles examine urban conflict
or one-sided violence. Five of the articles in this issue examine aspects of interstate
conflict, though for the most part at a lower level of violence—militarized disputes
rather than major war. Water resources, in the form of shared rivers or aquifers, play
a key role in four of these studies. De Stefano et al. (2012) assess the 276 inter-
national river basins for changes in water variability and institutional resilience.
They map the basins most at risk for hydropolitical tension and discuss how to
target capacity-building to strengthen resilience to climate change and the devel-
opment of mechanisms for cooperation and conflict resolution. Tir/Stinnett (2012)
ﬁnd that water scarcity increases the risk of militarized conflict, but that institu-
tionalized agreements can offset the risk. Bernauer/Siegfried (2012) examine the
Syr Darya catchment, a promising candidate for a neo-malthusian conflict over
international water resources, but conclude that a militarized interstate dispute is
unlikely. Another worst case in terms of the potential for water conflict, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is discussed by Feitelson et al. (2012). They conclude
that it is unlikely that climate change will directly influence the conflict, although
the securitization of the water issue may affect the negotiating positions of the
parties.
8For skeptical discussions of the impact of climate change on the violence in Darfur, see Brown
(2010) and Kevane/Gray (2008).
9www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_non-state_conflict_dataset_/.
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9.5 Balancing Effects?
None of the articles in this issue focus on possible positive effects of climate
change. In theory, despite the many pessimistic predictions about global food
security under global warming,10 local or regional improvements in the conditions
for food production might offset current food insecurity in some areas and help to
lower the risk of local scarcity conflict. But this remains to be studied. Gartzke
(2012) argues that economic development, which drives climate change, also
lowers the risk of interstate conflict. Therefore, even if climate change drives
conflict, the effect may not be visible if it is overshadowed by the peacebuilding
effect of economic development. Perhaps the overriding concern with economic
development in the Third World can also explain a surprising ﬁnding in Kvaløy
et al. (2012). Using worldwide public opinion data, they observe widespread
concern about global warming, but lower rather than higher in countries that are
expected to be more seriously affected.
9.6 Where It Matters?
There is indeed a focus on the developing world. Apart from the articles with a
global scope, there is a strong concentration on Africa, particularly south of the
Sahara, while one article deals with the Middle East and another with central Asia.
The bloodiest wars in the second half of the 20th century occurred in East and
Southeast Asia, but by the turn of the century there were fewer conflicts in these
areas and those that remained were at much lower levels of severity. The scholarly
community may have seen climate-related conflicts as more likely to arise in Africa
because of that continent’s heavy dependence on rainfed agriculture. But in view of
the public concern about the effects of sea-level rise and the melting of the
Himalayan glaciers, the impact of climate change for conflict in Asia also seems
like a worthwhile topic for future research.
10IPCC (2007: WG2, Chap. 5, Sect. 5.8.1 Findings and Key Conclusions) concludes with high
conﬁdence that ‘[p]rojected changes in the frequency and severity of extreme climate events will
have more serious consequences for food and forestry production, and food insecurity, than will
changes in projected means of temperature and precipitation’, that ‘[c]limate change increases the
number of people at risk of hunger’ but that ‘[t]he impact of chosen socio-economic pathways
(SRES scenario) on the numbers of people at risk of hunger is signiﬁcantly greater than the impact
of climate change’, and that ‘[c]limate change will further shift the focus of food insecurity to
sub-Saharan Africa’ (so that ‘[by] 2080, about 75 % of all people at risk of hunger are estimated to
live in this region’), and (with medium conﬁdence) that ‘moderate warming beneﬁts crop and
pasture yields in mid- to high-latitude regions’. Collier et al. (2010) argue that the grave conse-
quences of climate change for agriculture in Africa should be countered by industrialization,
urbanization, and new agricultural technology (including genetically modiﬁed organisms).
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9.7 Other Concerns
Some case study-oriented researchers (Homer-Dixon 1994; Kahl 2006) have argued
that many case studies ﬁnd support for a scarcity model of conflict while large-N
statistical research generally fails to do so (see e.g. Theisen 2008). However, other
case studies (e.g. Benjaminsen 2008) are closer to the skeptical position. In this
issue, and in the current literature generally, there is no systematic difference
between case studies and statistical investigations. While some of the case study
literature has been criticized for studying only the conflict cases (Gleditsch 1998), it
can also be faulted for relatively shallow case description and theoretical myopia.
More recently, the large-N conflict literature has moved away from an exclusive
reliance on the ‘country-year’ approach, towards geographical and temporal dis-
aggregation (Cederman/Gleditsch 2009). The ambition is to measure conflict as
well as explanatory variables for short time intervals and for subnational regions or
territorial grid cells. This approach seems particularly appropriate to the study of
effects of variables such as climate change that do not vary along national
boundaries, and it may help to bridge the gap between case studies and large-N
studies.
One of the lessons that the large-N community could learn from proponents of
case studies is the emphasis on interaction effects. Homer-Dixon (1994) and Kahl
(2006) do not argue that environmental change generally and climate change
speciﬁcally have a major impact on conflict—the effect plays out in interaction with
exogenous conflict-promoting factors (Buhaug et al. 2008, 2010). Koubi et al.
(2012) and Tir/Stinnett (2012) take a step in this direction in testing for interactions
with institutions and regime type respectively. Koﬁ Annan (2006: 9–10) argued in
one of his last reports as UN Secretary-General, that ‘pollution, population growth
and climate change are … occurring now and hitting the poorest and most vul-
nerable hardest. Environmental degradation has the potential to destabilize already
conflict-prone regions, especially when compounded by inequitable access or
politicization of access to scarce resources.’ Here, he is invoking an interaction
effect of climate change with no less than three other variables. Unfortunately, it
seems unlikely that case study researchers or large-N scholars will launch a sys-
tematic investigation of such complicated interaction patterns any time soon.
In reviewing an article for this issue, William Nordhaus11 was rather critical:
‘this is a paper about weather, not climate’. The Glossary in IPCC (2007) deﬁnes
climate as ‘average weather’, usually over a 30-year period.12 Most of the studies
reported here operate over shorter time periods, so this criticism has considerable
substance, although Hendrix/Salehyan (2012) and Koubi et al. (2012) measure
climate variation as deviations from long-term averages. A few recent studies take a
very long-term perspective (e.g. Zhang et al. 2006 for China and Tol/Wagner 2010
11Review, 16 November 2010; permission to cite by name, personal communication, 4 November
2011.
12For a critical discussion of different deﬁnitions of climate change, see Pielke (2005).
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for Europe). With data for a whole millennium,13 they conclude that war was more
frequent in colder periods. However, Tol and Wagner add that the relationship
weakens in the industrialized world. A plausible interpretation of this is that agri-
cultural production suffers in the cold periods, but that with increasing industrial-
ization the world moves away from malthusian constraints. The conflict data used
in these studies have not been well tested and for obvious reasons there is a lack of
control variables. Based on regularities observed by historians in the distant past
and using UCDP/PRIO conflict data for the period 1950–2004, Hsiang et al. (2011)
argue that the El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) has a signiﬁcant influence on
the onset of civil conflict. The link to global warming is tenuous and questions have
been raised about the robustness of this ﬁnding. But if it holds up, it provides
another indication that armed conflict may be related to the climate even in the
modern age. In any case, better integration between the long-term climate studies
and the studies of ‘weather’ changes reported here, is a priority item on the research
agenda.
9.8 Conclusions
Climate change is the world’s ﬁrst truly global manmade environmental problem14
and a ﬁrm warning that human activities can influence our physical environment on
a global scale. The range of possible consequences of climate change is so wide,
even for the limited temperature changes foreseen in the IPCC scenarios, that it is
difﬁcult to sort out the main priorities. Obviously, if a reversal of the trend towards
a more peaceful world was one of these consequences, it should have a prominent
place on the policy agenda. Based on the research reported here, such a pessimistic
view may not be warranted in the short to medium run. However, as noted by
Feitelson et al. (2012) and Salehyan (2008), framing climate change as a security
issue may influence the perceptions of the actors in local and regional conflict and
lead to militarized responses and thus perhaps contribute to a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy.
The study of the relationship between climate change and conflict has advanced
noticeably in the past ﬁve years. With regard to how changes in precipitation may
influence internal conflict, the one area where we now have a fair number of studies,
the dominant view seems to be that rainfall abundance is associated with greater
risks than drought and that in any case other conflict-generating factors are more
important. Studies of how climate change may promote interstate conflict over
water resources also seem to point in the direction of a weak or a null
13Or even two, as in Zhang et al. (2010).
14As distinct from international environmental problems such as transboundary pollution (acid
rain, pollution in international rivers). The depletion of the ozone layer was another global
problem. But it was solved quite rapidly through a mix of unilateral action and an international
agreement, although it will take a few generations for the ozone layer to recover completely.
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relationship. In other areas, the number of studies is still very low, so it is premature
to offer a summary. On the whole, however, it seems fair to say that so far there is
not yet much evidence for climate change as an important driver of conflict. In
recent reviews of this literature, Bernauer et al. (2012) and Gleditsch et al. (2011)
conclude that although environmental change may under certain circumstances
increase the risk of violent conflict, the existing evidence indicates that this is not
generally the case.
While we primarily hope that the studies presented here will have an impact on
scholarly research in this area, they could also have an influence on policymaking.
The IPCC is currently working on its Fifth Assessment Report, scheduled for
release in 2013. For the ﬁrst time, this report will have a chapter on the conse-
quences of climate change for human security, including armed conflict (IPCC, no
date). We hope that the studies reported here will contribute to a balanced
assessment by the IPCC, built on the best peer-reviewed evidence.
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